EVENTS



2nd online meeting


Wednesday, May 11, 2022. 


Zoom registration here


Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)

  • 9.00 - 9.10am: introductory remarks. 
  • 9.10 - 9.45am: Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (De La Salle University) - A neglected reply to some liar-type paradoxes: Jose Encarnacion’s “On Ushenko’s version of the liar paradox.
    • Abstract: In Problems of Logic, A. P. Ushenko presents a version of the liar paradox, which he claims to be an exception to Russell’s theory of types or Ramsey’s theory of language levels. Jose Encarnacion, however, shows that far from being an exception to these theories, Ushenko’s paradox only rests on a mere symbolic fallacy (“On Unshenko’s version of the Liar paradox”, Mind, 1955). In this paper, I aim to evaluate Encarnacion’s argument for his verdict by looking at the immediate responses to it. 
  • 9.45 - 9.55am: Ben Blumson (National University of Singapore) - comments.  
  • 9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A. 
  • 10.20 - 10.30am: Break.
  • 10.30 - 11.05am: Hwan Ho and Hsuan-Chih Lin (Soochow University) - Mereological Nominalism: From a Locationist Point of View.
    • Abstract: Mereological nominalism is a theory of properties infamous for its absurd consequences: the property had by one thing is also had by its parts, and two co-extensional properties would be identical. In this paper, we argue that a revision from locationism is able to deal with these problems in a mereological way, pace Effingham (2020), who offers a non-mereological revision. Moreover, this account not only avoids the absurd consequences but provides an account of how relations work: a yet unsolved problem for other mereological nominalists. 
  • 11.05 - 11.15am: Daniel Giberman (University of Texas at Arlington) - comments.
  • 11.15 - 11.40am: Q & A. 
  • 11.40 - 11.45am: closing remarks. 


+1hr Japan & Korea 

+2hrs Sydney 

+4hrs New Zealand

Arlington, Texas: Tuesday, May 10, 8.00 - 10.45pm




Inaugural network meeting


Wednesday, February 16, 2022. 


Zoom registration here.


Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)

  • 9.00 - 9.10am: introductory remarks. 
  • 9.10 - 9.45am: Kai-Yuan Cheng, National Yang-Ming Chiao-Tung University - The Incongruence Problem in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity.  
  • 9.45 - 9.55am: Mike LeBuffe, Otago University - comments on Cheng.  
  • 9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A. 
  • 10.20 - 10.30am: Break.
  • 10.30 - 11.05am: Justine Kingsbury, University of Waikato - Taking taniwha seriously: a step towards intercultural respect. 
  • 11.05 - 11.15am: Reina Saijo, Osaka University - comments on Kingsbury.
  • 11.15 - 11.40am: Q & A. 
  • 11.40 - 11.45am: closing remarks. 


+1hr Japan & Korea 

+3hrs Sydney 

+5hrs New Zealand



Kai-Yuan Cheng, National Yang-Ming Chiao-Tung University - The Incongruence Problem in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity.  

  • Abstract:  John Locke’s theory of personal identity is revolutionary in his time. It replaces both the idea of soul-substance in the Greek tradition and that of bodily resurrection in the Christian theology by offering a naturalistic consciousness-based account of personal identity to address the issues of divine rectification and moral/legal responsibilities. The aim of this talk is three-fold: i) I discuss a fundamental difficulty, which I dub “the incongruence problem”, that this theory faces: it sets up a high metaphysical standard that its psychologically-based account cannot meet; ii) I show that underlying the incongruence problem are Locke’s implicit commitments to three basic presuppositions: a) adopting the substance-mode metaphysics, b) essentializing in the identity-determination of a thing; iii) taking up God’s perspective. Making explicit these presuppositions would place us in a better position to evaluate some of the major contemporary theories of personal identity, as well as to look for some alternative approach that might be otherwise hard to find but deserve our attention. In particular, I shall demonstrate how the two major opposing camps—the psychological approach represented by Derek Parfit (1984) and the physical approach represented by Eric Olson (1997)—are committed to the same set of presuppositions in question and hence inherit the incongruence problem in their own ways. I shall further show how Mark Johnston’s (2010) judgment-dependence account and Marya Schechtman’s narrative-based account (1996, 2014) can be construed as revisionary along the Lockean line by abandoning one of the three presuppositions. Finally, I sketch a novel view of personal identity based on Zhuangzi’s philosophy which embodies an entirely different set of presuppositions from Locke’s, with the hope that this view provides us with a refreshing way of relocating ourselves as persons across time in the natural world.


Justine Kingsbury, University of Waikato - Taking taniwha seriously: a step towards intercultural respect

  • Abstract: Taniwha are powerful water creatures in Māori pūrākau (traditional narratives). Taniwha sometimes affect public works in New Zealand: for example, consultation between government agencies and tangata whenua (the people of the land) about proposed roading developments sometimes results in the route being moved to avoid the dwelling place of a taniwha. Media response tends to be hostile or mocking, as you might expect, since on the face of it the dominant western scientific worldview has no place for beings like taniwha. In this paper, I argue for a kind of realism about taniwha that might facilitate intercultural respect, taking as my starting point the work of Dan Hikuroa on the practical usefulness of taniwha pūrākau in encoding information about natural hazards.