Events

8th online meeting

April 17, 2024.

Zoom registration here.

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)

9.00 - 9.05am: Welcome and introductory remarks.
9.05 - 9.45am: Sam Baron, Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing and James Norton “Philosophical Methodology: A Plea for Tolerance”. Presented by Sam Baron (University of Melbourne) and James Norton (University of Tasmania).
9.45 - 9.55am: Comments by Jessica Pohlmann (Australian Catholic University)
9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A.
10.20 - 10.30am: Break.
10.30 - 11.10am: Akiko Frischhut (Sophia University, Tokyo) “Awareness Without Time”.
11.10 - 11.20am: Comments by Nicholas K. Rimell (Chinese University of Hong Kong).
11.20 - 11.45am: Q & A.
11.45 - 11.50am: Closing remarks.

Japan, Korea: +1 hrs

Sydney & Melbourne: +2 hrs.

New Zealand: +4 hrs.

Sam Baron, Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing and James Norton: Philosophical Methodology: A Plea for Tolerance

(Presented by Sam Baron (University of Melbourne) and James Norton (University of Tasmania))

Many prominent critiques of philosophical methods proceed by suggesting that some method is unreliable, especially in comparison to some alternative method. In light of this, it may seem natural to conclude that these (comparatively) unreliable methods should be abandoned. Drawing upon work on the division of cognitive labour in science, we argue things are not so straightforward. Rather, whether an unreliable method should be abandoned depends heavily on the crucial question of how we should divide philosophers’ time and effort between different methods, in order to maximise our prospects of achieving epistemic success. We show that, in a range of cases, even a (comparatively) unreliable method may deserve to be allocated some of these resources.

Akiko Frischhut (Sophia University, Tokyo): Awareness Without Time.

Recently, contemporary philosophers with an interest in consciousness have turned their attention towards “fringe states of consciousness”. Some examples may include dreams, trances and deep meditative states. Teetering between wakefulness and non-consciousness, fringe states illuminate the limits and boundaries of consciousness. This article aims to give a coherent conceptualization of deep meditative states, focussing in particular on the phenomenal temporality during meditation. Advanced meditators overwhelmingly describe deep states of meditation as atemporal and timeless; however, they also report being continuously alert while meditating. I intend to give a coherent interpretation of this apparent contradiction. After introducing some candidate interpretations, I shall argue that during (deepest) meditation, the subject experiences ‘pure duration’, that is, duration without temporal structure. This, I argue, explains best why meditators describe deep meditation as ongoing but timeless awareness. A central part of the talk will expand on a coherent account of phenomenal duration without phenomenal succession.

7th online meeting

January 11, 2024.

Zoom registration here.

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)

9.00 - 9.10am: introductory remarks.
9.10 - 9.45am: Szu-Yen Lin (Soochow University) - Interpreting Titles and Categories in Art".
9.45 - 9.55am: Comments by Matteo Ravasio (Peking University).
9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A.
10.20 - 10.30am: Break.
10.30 - 11.05am: Jeonggyu Lee (Sungkyunkwan University) - Retroactive Continuity and Fictional Facts.
11.05 - 11.15am: Comments by Junyeol Kim (Chungbuk National University).
11.15 - 11.40am: Q & A.
11.40 - 11.45am: Closing remarks.

Japan, Korea: +1 hrs.

Sydney & Melbourne: +3 hrs.

New Zealand: +5 hrs.

Szu-Yen Lin (Soochow University, Taiwan): Interpreting Titles and Categories in Art.

Ontological contextualism in contemporary analytic philosophy of art is the position that an artwork’s identity and contents are determined in part by its relation to the relevant contextual factors holding at the time when it was created. Among these are a work’s title and the author’s categorial intention. It is generally agreed that before we interpret a work, we should correctly identify it by, for example, viewing it under the right title or locating it in the artistic category to which the author intended it to belong. I argue that some contextual factors—titles and categories in particular—cannot be accepted as they are without being interpreted. Only when we have an account of interpreting titles and categories can we proceed to interpret works.

Jeonggyu Lee (Sungkyunkwan University): Retroactive Continuity and Fictional Facts.

This paper deals with the phenomenon of retroactive continuity, or retcon for short, which is a literaldevice where the truth-value of a proposition in an earlier fictional work is changed by a later work. The primary aim of this paper is to provide the most compelling explanation for retroactive continuity. I first defend the metaphysical view about fiction, according to which when retconning occurs, a fictional work changes its property of containing a proposition while preserving its identity. I then argue that this view is theoretically preferable to all other competing approaches.

6th online meeting

Thursday, October 26, 2023.

Zoom registration here.

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)

9:00 - 9:10am: introductory remarks.
9.10 - 10.00am:Mark Siderits(Kyoto University) - The Two Truths in Buddhist Philosophy.
10:00 - 10:15am: Koji Tanaka (Australian National University) - Comments
10:15am - 10.25am:Mark Siderits- Response
10:25am - 11:00am: Q & A

Japan, Korea: +1 hrs.

Sydney & Melbourne: +3 hrs.

New Zealand: +5 hrs.

The Two Truths in Buddhist Philosophy - abstract:

Philosophers of the classical Indian Buddhist tradition distinguished between statements that are ultimately true and statements that are only conventionally true. They likewise held that entities may be said to be real either in an ultimate or strict sense, or else in a ‘back-bencher’ sense of being merely conventionally real. This talk discusses the origins of this ultimate/conventional distinction, its elaboration, and several of its applications. These include its use in defense of mereological nihilism, its role in resolving some apparent paradoxes, and finally its being the basis for a possible response to the so-called ‘free will’ (the problem of the alleged incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility).

5th online meeting

Wednesday, October 18, 2023.

Zoom registration here.

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)

9:00 - 9:10am: introductory remarks.
9.10 - 10.00am: Sonam Thakchoe (University of Tasmania) - Four Noble Truths as Deflationary Pragmatic Truths.
10:00 - 10:15am: Thomas Doctor (Rangjung Yeshe Institute) - Comments
10:15am - 10.25am: Sonam Thakchoe - Response
10:25am - 11:00am: Q & A

Japan, Korea: +1 hrs.

Sydney & Melbourne: +3 hrs.

New Zealand: +5 hrs.

Four Noble Truths as Deflationary Pragmatic Truths - abstract:

The teachings of Buddha are centred around the four noble truths, which were discovered by him through intense reflection. These truths are (1) the truth of suffering, (2) the truth of the origin of suffering, (3) the truth of the cessation of suffering, and (4) the truth of the path of leading to the cessation of suffering. They represent the core of Buddha's philosophy and contain his practical teachings. Buddha declared his full enlightenment upon realizing these truths directly. My paper examines the type of truth that the four noble truths represent in contemporary philosophical terms. Traditionally, the correspondence and coherence theories of truth have dominated Western philosophy. However, applying these theories to the four noble truths is not fitting. Instead, I propose that Buddha was a pragmatist abhout truth and that the four noble truths can be interpreted as pragmatic truths. I suggest that the language of the pragmatist tradition founded by William James and John Dewey is a more appropriate way to articulate these truths. However, the proposed interpretation differs from traditional Western pragmatism. Instead, I defend that the four noble truths are deeply deflationary pragmatic truths, satisfying the key pragmatic criteria of assimilation, corroboration, and verification.

4th online meeting

Monday, July 16, 2023.

Zoom registration here.

Schedule (Thailand):

2.00 - 2.10pm: introdoctory remarks.
2.10 - 3.00pm: Soraj Hongladarom (Chulalongkorn University) - The Buddhist Middle Way as a Basis for Political Pluralism.
- Abstract: The Buddhist Middle Way is based on the idea that one should not become attached to anything. Since everything is ultimately insubstantial and does not retain its own substantive individual identity, holding on to something always leads to dissatisfaction, disappointment, and other forms of mental afflictions known asduhkha, usually translated as suffering. Among the things that one must not become attached to are views or beliefs. That is, one must not be attached to a view or a belief, regarding any of them as an ultimate truth, but instead regard all views as dependent on causes and conditions. Since pluralism is based on the view that one cannot know all the truth, or that it is not possible, through any of these views, to attain Ultimate Truth, the Buddhist Middle Way is then amenable to pluralism. As one must not be attached to any view, one must then regard a view as,prima facie,equally important as any other view. This does not imply the absurd consequence that one can accept contradictory statements as being true, nor does it imply relativism. The upshot, then, is that epistemological, and hence political, pluralism follows.
3.00 - 3.15pm: Frank Hoffman (Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University) - comments.
3.15 - 3.25pm: Soraj Hongladarom - response.
3.25 - 4.00pm: discussion.

Singapore, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan: +1 hr.

Japan, Korea: +2 hrs.

Sydney & Melbourne: +3 hrs.

New Zealand: +5 hrs.

3rd online meeting

Wednesday, September 7, 2022.

Zoom registration here.

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong):

9.00 - 9.10am: introductory remarks.
9.10 - 9.45am: Natalja Deng (Underwood International College, Yonsei University) - What if time were ineffable?
9.45 - 9.55am: Akiko Frischhut (Akita International University) - comments
9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A
10.20 - 10.30am: Break
10.30 - 11.05am: Joel Katzav (University of Queensland) - Grace Andrus de Laguna's critique of analytic philosophy
11.05 - 11.15am: Joe Ulatowski (University of Waikato) - comments
11.15 - 11.40am: Q & A
11.40 - 11.45am: Closing remarks

Natalja Deng - What if time were ineffable?

Abstract:Well, for one thing, it would be difficult to (give a) talk about it. Actually, the talk will suggest that what is ineffable is time’s nature with respect to the question of dynamicity (whether time is dynamic in a way that space is not). The question of dynamicity would be a kind of conceptual veil beyond which we can’t look, except to hypothesize that there is something beyond. There are two intended upshots: (1) the question of dynamicity is in the background of all enquiry into time (whether done by physicists, philosophers, or interested folk), and (2) it can safely be left there. The talk will outline the ineffability view, address the paradox of ineffability and put ineffability to work for the Flowing Block (aka Tenseless Passage) view.

Joel Katzav -Grace Andrus de Laguna's critique of analytic philosophy

Abstract:Many of the arguments and positions Grace Andrus de Laguna developed during the early decades of the twentieth century came to be central to analytic philosophy. These arguments and positions included, even before 1930, a critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a private language argument, a use theory of meaning, a critique of type physicalism, a functionalist theory of mind, a critique of internalism about mental content, a critique of reductionism in science, a methodology of research programs in science and more. Nevertheless, de Laguna identified herself as a defender of the speculative vision of philosophy, a vision which, in her words, “analytic philosophy condemns.” I present her speculative vision of philosophy as well as some of the main ways in which she found analytic philosophy to be wanting. I also outline one of her main arguments against analytic philosophy, specifically her philosophy of science- and philosophy of language-based argument against the view that key parts of established opinion, e.g., common sense or science, should be assumed to be true at the outset of philosophical inquiry. I, further, briefly consider how her argument bears on the views of George E. Moore, Willard V. Quine and David Lewis.

2nd online meeting

Wednesday, May 11, 2022.

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong):

9.10 - 9.45am: Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (De La Salle University) - A neglected reply to some liar-type paradoxes: Jose Encarnacion’s “On Ushenko’s version of the liar paradox.
- Abstract: In Problems of Logic, A. P. Ushenko presents a version of the liar paradox, which he claims to be an exception to Russell’s theory of types or Ramsey’s theory of language levels. Jose Encarnacion, however, shows that far from being an exception to these theories, Ushenko’s paradox only rests on a mere symbolic fallacy (“On Unshenko’s version of the Liar paradox”, Mind, 1955). In this paper, I aim to evaluate Encarnacion’s argument for his verdict by looking at the immediate responses to it.
9.45 - 9.55am: Ben Blumson (National University of Singapore) - comments.
9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A.
10.20 - 10.30am: Break.
10.30 - 11.05am: Hwan Ho and Hsuan-Chih Lin (Soochow University) - Mereological Nominalism: From a Locationist Point of View.
- Abstract: Mereological nominalism is a theory of properties infamous for its absurd consequences: the property had by one thing is also had by its parts, and two co-extensional properties would be identical. In this paper, we argue that a revision from locationism is able to deal with these problems in a mereological way, pace Effingham (2020), who offers a non-mereological revision. Moreover, this account not only avoids the absurd consequences but provides an account of how relations work: a yet unsolved problem for other mereological nominalists.
11.05 - 11.15am: Daniel Giberman (University of Texas at Arlington) - comments.
11.15 - 11.40am: Q & A.
11.40 - 11.45am: closing remarks.

+1hr Japan & Korea

+2hrs Sydney

+4hrs New Zealand

Arlington, Texas: Tuesday, May 10, 8.00 - 10.45pm

Inaugural network meeting

Wednesday, February 16, 2022.

Zoom registration here.

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong):

9.00 - 9.10am: introductory remarks.
9.10 - 9.45am: Kai-Yuan Cheng, National Yang-Ming Chiao-Tung University - The Incongruence Problem in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity.
9.45 - 9.55am: Mike LeBuffe, Otago University - comments on Cheng.
9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A.
10.20 - 10.30am: Break.
10.30 - 11.05am: Justine Kingsbury, University of Waikato - Taking taniwha seriously: a step towards intercultural respect.
11.05 - 11.15am: Reina Saijo, Osaka University - comments on Kingsbury.
11.15 - 11.40am: Q & A.
11.40 - 11.45am: closing remarks.

+1hr Japan & Korea

+3hrs Sydney

+5hrs New Zealand

Kai-Yuan Cheng, National Yang-Ming Chiao-Tung University - The Incongruence Problem in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity.

Abstract: John Locke’s theory of personal identity is revolutionary in his time. It replaces both the idea of soul-substance in the Greek tradition and that of bodily resurrection in the Christian theology by offering a naturalistic consciousness-based account of personal identity to address the issues of divine rectification and moral/legal responsibilities. The aim of this talk is three-fold: i) I discuss a fundamental difficulty, which I dub “the incongruence problem”, that this theory faces: it sets up a high metaphysical standard that its psychologically-based account cannot meet; ii) I show that underlying the incongruence problem are Locke’s implicit commitments to three basic presuppositions: a) adopting the substance-mode metaphysics, b) essentializing in the identity-determination of a thing; iii) taking up God’s perspective. Making explicit these presuppositions would place us in a better position to evaluate some of the major contemporary theories of personal identity, as well as to look for some alternative approach that might be otherwise hard to find but deserve our attention. In particular, I shall demonstrate how the two major opposing camps—the psychological approach represented by Derek Parfit (1984) and the physical approach represented by Eric Olson (1997)—are committed to the same set of presuppositions in question and hence inherit the incongruence problem in their own ways. I shall further show how Mark Johnston’s (2010) judgment-dependence account and Marya Schechtman’s narrative-based account (1996, 2014) can be construed as revisionary along the Lockean line by abandoning one of the three presuppositions. Finally, I sketch a novel view of personal identity based on Zhuangzi’s philosophy which embodies an entirely different set of presuppositions from Locke’s, with the hope that this view provides us with a refreshing way of relocating ourselves as persons across time in the natural world.

Justine Kingsbury, University of Waikato - Taking taniwha seriously: a step towards intercultural respect

Abstract: Taniwha are powerful water creatures in Māori pūrākau (traditional narratives). Taniwha sometimes affect public works in New Zealand: for example, consultation between government agencies and tangata whenua (the people of the land) about proposed roading developments sometimes results in the route being moved to avoid the dwelling place of a taniwha. Media response tends to be hostile or mocking, as you might expect, since on the face of it the dominant western scientific worldview has no place for beings like taniwha. In this paper, I argue for a kind of realism about taniwha that might facilitate intercultural respect, taking as my starting point the work of Dan Hikuroa on the practical usefulness of taniwha pūrākau in encoding information about natural hazards.